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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Adoption by Estoppel - Inheritance From the
Adopted Person
Petitioners brought suit to establish that they were the heirs at
law of X. Petitioners alleged: that they were the heirs at law of A
and B, husband and wife, both of whom predeceased X; that X, as
a child, was delivered by his natural mother to A and B under an
agreement that they would legally adopt him (there was no allega-
tion that X was formally adopted); that during a period of ap-
proximately twenty years the parties lived in a relationship in all
respects consistent with that of parent and child; that as a result of
the foregoing facts there was an equitable adoption of X; and that
by provision of the Probate Code' petitioners were entitled to inherit
the estate of X. Held: The legal status of parent and child is not
created by parties assuming and living in a relationship of parent
and child pursuant to an unperformed agreement to adopt the child.
The Texas doctrine of "equitable adoption" or "adoption by estoppel"
operates in favor of the child against the adoptive parents and those
claiming through them, but does not operate to allow the adoptive
parents or those claiming through them to inherit from the adopted
child. Heien v. Crabtree, -Tex.-, 369 S.W.2d 28 (1963).
Adoption was unknown at common law.' Because the adoption
statutes' are in derogation of the common law, courts have applied
the rule of strict construction and have demanded exact compliance
with formalities.4 However, to mitigate the harshness of this rule and
to afford protection to the child, a large number of states,' including
Texas," have developed the doctrine of equitable adoption. The ma-
jority of jurisdictions granting this form of relief base it upon specific
performance of the contract to adopt." Other jurisdictions classify
'Tex. Prob. Code Ann. §§ 3 (b), 40 (1956). Pertinent portions are quoted in the text
accompanying note 26 infra.
' Eckford v. Knox, 67 Tex. 200, 2 S.W. 372 (1886); Powell v. Ott, 146 S.W. 1019 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1912).
'Texas adoption procedure is contained in Tex. Rev. Civ. Star. Ann. art. 46(a) (1959).
4Royal Neighbors v. Fletcher, 230 S.W. 476 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921); Harle v. Harle,
166 S.W. 674 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914), rev'd on other grounds, 109 Tex. 214, 204 S.W. 317
(1918); Guffey Petroleum Co. v. Hooks, 47 Tex. Civ. App. 560, 106 S.W. 690 (1907)
error ref.
'See authorities cited in notes 7, 8 infra.
'Cavanaugh v. Davis, 149 Tex. 573, 235 S.W.2d 972 (1951); Jones v. Guy, 135 Tex.
398, 143 S.W.2d 906 (1940); Cheney v. Coffee, 131 Tex. 212, 113 S.W.2d 162 (1938);
Cubley v. Barbee, 123 Tex. 411, 73 S.W.2d 72 (1934).
Representative of the cases applying the remedy of specific performance are: Prince v.
Prince, 194 Ala. 455, 69 So. 906 (1915); Toler v. Goodin, 200 Ga. 527, 37 S.E.2d 609
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the remedy as estoppel in pais. Although language can be found
that indicates the remedy of specific performance is available in
Texas for this type contract,9 in Cubley v. Barbee"° the Texas Supreme
Court said: "[W]e are of the opinion that the real classification of
the remedy is that of estoppel."" In Texas, the person" asserting the
estoppel has the burden of proving: (1) an agreement to adopt,1
(2) reliance by the child upon the adoptive status, 1'4 and (3) per-
formance by the child at filial duties."
Although equitable adoption was developed primarily to protect the
interests of the child," it was inevitable that attempts would be made
to extend the use of the doctrine. Courts have been almost unanimous
in the view that a decree of equitable adoption does not create the same
legal status of parent and child as does a legal adoption.' The question
whether the heirs of the adoptive parent may inherit from the equit-
ably adopted child was answered negatively by the Missouri Supreme
Court in Rumans v. Lighthizer." The same question was presented in
an earlier Texas case, but was not answered because the proof necessary
(1946); Crawford v. Wilson, 139 Ga. 654, 78 S.E. 30 (1913); Malaney v. Cameron, 98
Kan. 620, 159 Pac. 19 (1916); Fiske v. Lawton, 124 Minn. 85, 144 N.W. 455 (1913);
In re Garcia's Estate, 45 N.M. 8, 107 P.2d 866 (1940); Barney v. Hutchinson, 25 N.M. 82,
177 Pac. 890 (1918); see Annot., 171 A.L.R. 1315 (1947); Annot., 142 A.L.R. 84 (1943);
Annot., 27 A.L.R. 1325 (1923).
'In re Painter's Estate, 246 Iowa 307, 67 N.W.2d 617 (1954); Thompson v. Mosely,
344 Mo. 240, 125 S.W.2d 860 (1939); Milligan v. McLaughlin, 94 Neb. 171, 142 N.W.
675 (1913).
, Cheney v. Coffey, 131 Tex. 212, 113 S.W.2d 162 (1938); Cubley v. Barbee, 123 Tex.
411, 73 S.W.2d 72 (1934).
"123 Tex. 411, 73 S.W.2d 72 (1934).
Id. at 83. The principal case reaffirmed that classification. 369 S.W.2d at 31.
"No binding Texas authority can be found which would support permitting any person
other than the adopted person to assert the estoppel. On the other hand, the cases (including
the principal case) have not used language which would definitely so limit the person capable
of asserting the estoppel. The question whether the descendants of the adopted person might
claim the benefit of the estoppel against the proper persons has not been decided.
"Cavanaugh v. Davis, 149 Tex. 573, 235 S.W.2d 972 (1951). Generally, this is required
in jurisdictions basing relief upon specific performance as distinguished from estoppel. Texas
courts have also made this a requirement to establish an adoption by estoppel. Analysis of
the purpose of this requirement is beyond the scope of this Note. See generally Bailey,
Adoption "By Estoppel," 36 Texas L. Rev. 30 (1957); Comment, Adoption by Estoppel:
History and Effect, 15 Baylor L. Rev. 162 (1963); Comment, The Doctrine of Equitable
Adoption, 9 Sw. L.J. 90 (1955).
14Cubley v. Barbee, 123 Tex. 411, 73 S.W.2d 72 (1934).
1' Ibid. An exact description of the performance required from the child cannot be found
in the cases. "Performance by the child" and similar phrases appear to be shorthand methods
of stating that the child has conferred love, affection, and other benefits upon the adoptive
parents in reliance upon his adoptive status. See Jones v. Guy, 135 Tex. 398, 143 S.W.2d 906
(1940).
" Cubley v. Barbee, 123 Tex. 411, 73 S.W.2d 72 (1934).
ls7 Wooster v. Iowa State Tax Comm'r, 230 Iowa 797, 298 N.W. 922 (1941); In re
Olson's Estate, 244 Minn. 449, 70 N.W.2d 107 (1955); Rumans v. Lighthizer, 363 Mo. 125,
249 S.W.2d 397 (1952). Contra, Radovich v. Citizens Nat'l Trust & Say. Bank, 48 Cal. 2d
116, 308 P.2d 14 (1957).
"363 Mo. 125, 249 S.W.2d 397 (1952).
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to establish equitable adoption was lacking." The concurring opinion
in the Texas case expressed the belief that the evidence was sufficient
to establish adoption by estoppel, but that the estoppel did not inure
to the benefit of the adoptive parents or their kin.'
The Texas Supreme Court, in deciding the instant case, reiterated
that the better theory upon which to establish equitable adoption is
estoppel in pais.2' However, the court pointed out that there could
not be an estoppel raised in this case because (1) petitioners' rights
can be no better or higher than the rights of those through whom
they claim and (2) the adoptive parents (through whom petitioners
claim) could not have asserted an estoppel against the adopted child
because there would be no basis in promises, acts, or conduct on his
part upon which to erect the estoppel." In support of its reasoning,
the court quoted with approval from the Rumans case: "An equitable
adoption functions to enforce the rights of the child under the
agreement to adopt .... [T]he enforcement in equity of the agree-
ment to adopt should not confer additional rights upon the adoptive
parent.""
Although the majority opinion in the principal case is in accord-
ance with traditional principles of estoppel, the dissenting justices
felt that the majority had "refused to recognize and carry out the
plain provisions of the [Probate Code]. ' Pertinent portions of the
sections of the Probate Code referred to are:
§ 3 Definitions ....
When used in this Code, unless otherwise apparent from the context:
(b) "Child" includes an adopted child, whether adopted by any existing
or former statutory procedure, or by acts of estoppel. . . . (Emphasis
added.)
§ 40. For purposes of inheritance under the laws of descent and
distribution, an adopted child shall be regarded as the child of the
parent or parents by adoption . . . such parent or parents by adop-
tion and their kin inheriting from and through such adopted child.
. . . The presence of this section specifically relating to the rights
of adopted children shall in no way diminish the rights of such chil-
9 Moorman v. Hunnicutt, 325 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959) error ref. n.r.e.2 Id. at 951.
" See text accompanying notes 9-11 supra. Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 3 (b) (1956), quoted
in text accompanying note 26 infra, adopts the estoppel theory of equitable adoption.
2 369 S.W.2d at 30. Accord, Farmer's State Bank v. Largent, 132 S.W.2d 482 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1939) error ref.; Allen v. Hall, 52 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932).
23 369 S.W.2d at 30. Accord, Liberty State Bank v. Guardian Say. & Loan Ass'n, 127
Tex. 311, 94 S.W.2d 133 (1936); Elsesser v. Cotham, 250 S.W.2d 591 (Tex. Civ. App.
1952); Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Athens Lodge, 207 S.W.2d 217 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947)
error ref. n.r.e.; Brown v. Federal Land Bank, 180 S.W.2d 647 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944)
error ref. w.o.sn.; Universal Credit Co. v. O'Neal, 140 S.W.2d 596 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940).
24Rumans v. Lighthizer, 363 Mo. 125, 249 S.W.2d 397, 401 (1952).
2' 369 S.W.2d at 32.
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dren, under the laws of descent and distribution or otherwise, which
they acquire by virtue of their inclusion in the definition of "child"
which is contained in this Code." (Emphasis added.)
The dissenters were of the opinion that the legislature recognized
an adoptive status created by acts of estoppel and provided for in-
heritance by and from the adopted child in such a situation.
Although the majority cited the Rumans case"' to support the
holding, there is a significant difference between the applicable
Missouri"s and Texas"9 statutes. The Missouri statutes do not specifi-
cally refer to equitable adoption."0 Moreover, the Missouri statute
that provides for inheritance by and from an adopted child, by ex-
press terms, applies only to children adopted in accordance with the
statutory procedure and thus does not suggest an intention to pro-
vide for inheritance from an equitably adopted child."' Despite the
difference in statutes, the court's decision has placed the Texas "quasi
adopted child"a into almost the same status as his Missouri counter-
part.u
The decision in the principal case could have far-reaching effects.
Those which are most important, and the easiest to foresee, concern
intestate succession. The "quasi adopted child" has no status as a
"oTex. Prob. Code Ann. §§ 3 (b), 40 (1956).
27 Rumans v. Lighthizer, 363 Mo. 125, 249 S.W.2d 397 (1952).
"oMo. Rev. Stat. §§ 453.090 (1952), 472.010 (1956).
"9Tex. Prob. Code Ann. §§ 3(b), 40 (1956). For the applicable portions of these sec-
tions, see text accompanying note 26 suPra.
"°Compare Mo. Rev. Star. 5 472.010 (1956) (which defines child as follows: "child
includes an adopted child . . ."), with Tex. Prob. Code Ann. S 3 (b) (1956) which is quoted
in text accompanying note 26 supra.
a" Mo. Rev. Stat. § 453.090 (1952). See McIntyre v. Hardesty, 347 Mo. 805, 149 S.W.2d
334 (1941).
The omission of this requirement in Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 40 is significant in view of
its presence in Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 46(a), 5 9 (1952) from which the language
for the probate code section was derived.
s" To facilitate distinction in comparisons to be made in subsequent text, the adjective
form of "quasi" will be coupled with the descriptive names of the parties to distinguish a
relationship such as exists in the principal case from a true status of equitable adoption.
' The extent of the equitably adopted child's status in Missouri is a right to share in
the estate of the adoptive parent. Rumans v. Lighthizer, 363 Mo. 125, 249 S.W.2d 397
(1952); Menees v. Cowgill, 359 Mo. 697, 223 S.W.2d 412 (1949); Weber v. Griffiths, 349
Mo. 145, 159 S.W.2d 670 (1942); McIntyre v. Hardesty, 347 Mo. 805, 149 S.W.2d 334
(1941).
Texas cases have not limited the status to this extent, but, on the other hand, no con-
trolling Texas authority can be found which has allowed a successful assertion of adoption
by estoppel for any purpose other than to allow the child a share in the estate of an adoptive
parent. In Price v. Price, 217 S.W.2d 905 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949) error ref. n.r.e., the child
claimed a share in the adoptive parent's father's estate, but relief was denied on another
ground. In Asbeck v. Asbeck, - Tex. -, 369 S.W.2d 915 (1963), the court by way
of dictum said that the "quasi adopted child" would be precluded by the holding of the
principal case from asserting an adoption by estoppel against his adoptive parent's collateral
heirs for the purpose of sharing in the adoptive parent's brother's estate as a descendant of
the deceased adoptive parent.
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legally adopted child except as to those persons who are estopped to
deny that the child was adopted; viz, the adoptive parents or those
claiming under or through them."4 Several unfortunate consequences
could result from an application of the principal case. For example,
upon the death intestate of the "quasi adopted child" without sur-
viving spouse, children, or descendants of children: The "quasi
adoptive parents" could not prevent the natural parents or their
kin from claiming the estate including any property that the "quasi
adoptive parents" may have given the deceased."5 Furthermore, if no
natural heirs make claim to the estate, the "quasi adoptive parents"
or the heirs of such adoptive parents (as was the situation in the
principal case) can do nothing to prevent an escheat of the estate."
If the deceased was survived by a spouse but no children or their
descendants, one-half of the separate real property of the intestate
would pass to his natural parents or natural brothers and sisters and
their descendants. 7 No problem would arise as to community estate."8
In addition to the important direct consequence in the area of
descent and distribution, there may be several indirect ramifications
of the instant case. The apparent modification of the definition of
"child" as used in the Probate Code" creates some inconsistency in
the meaning of child; sometimes the definition will include a person
not formally adopted and sometimes it does not, depending on
whether an estoppel may be erected in accordance with the holding
of this case. The modified definition may have an important bearing
on sections of the Probate Code dealing with other matters, e.g.,
whether administration of community property is necessary."0 There
may be an important effect upon the interpretation of the word
"child" in wills"1 or even in a nonprobate document such as a trust
instrument.42
" The persons estopped have also been described as the "adoptive parents and their
privies." Cubley v. Barbee, 123 Tex. 411, 425, 73 S.W.2d 72, 79 (1934). "Privies" was
apparently used there as synonymous with persons claiming through the adoptive parent.
35 Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 38(a) (1956). The provision that the "natural parent or
parents of such child and their kin shall not inherit from or through said child . . . "
would be inoperative because there is no adoptive status. Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 40 (1956)
(semble).
"s Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. arts. 3272-89 (1952).
"
7 Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 38(b)2 (1956). See note 35 supra concerning § 40.
"STex. Prob. Code Ann. § 45 (1956) provides that all of the community estate will go
to the surviving spouse if there are no children or descendants of children. If there are
children or descendants of children, one-half goes to the surviving spouse and one-half passes
to the children or descendants.
39 See text accompanying note 26 supra.
'"Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 155 (1956). The necessity of administration of community
property is made to depend upon the existence of children of the deceased.
"Vaughn v. Vaughn, 161 Tex. 104, 337 S.W.2d 793 (1960).
" See Cutrer v. Cutrer, 162 Tex. 166, 345 S.W.2d 513 (1961); cf. Pittman v. Time
Sec., 301 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957).
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The consequences of the decision which are suggested here are not
exhaustive, nor are they designed to intimate that a holding in ac-
cordance with the views of the dissenters would be free of far-
reaching, and sometimes harsh, results. However, the decision ap-
parently clashes with the Probate Code treatment of this subject,
and the important consequences warrant further legislative enact-
ment if the legislature intends to place the "quasi adopted child" in
the same status as an adopted child.
James W. Brennan
Procedure - Res Judicata - Texas Wrongful Death Act
The plaintiff, as administrator of the estate of deceased, filed this
suit under the provisions of the Texas survival statute' to recover
on behalf of the estate the amount of the deceased's funeral expenses
and damages to the deceased's automobile. Previously, the plaintiff, as
parent of deceased and next friend of deceased's minor children and
not as administrator of the estate, had prosecuted a suit under the
Texas wrongful death act' against the same defendants and had ob-
tained a judgment. At the time of this prior suit, the plaintiff had
not qualified as administrator of the deceased's estate. In the present
suit, the district court granted defendant's motion for summary
judgment, and the court of civil appeals affirmed on the ground that
under the principles of res judicata the judgment in the prior wrong-
ful death action barred the claims asserted in the instant action be-
cause both suits were based upon the same negligent act. Held, re-
versed and remanded: A judgment in a wrongful death action, in
which the plaintiffs were not entitled to assert a claim for property
damages and had neither paid nor become legally responsible for
funeral expenses, does not preclude a subsequent suit brought by the
personal representative of the deceased against the same defendants
for recovery of funeral expenses and damage to the property of the
deceased. Landers v. B. F. Goodrich, - Tex. -, 369 S.W.2d 33
(1963).
With few exceptions, it was the common-law rule that tort actions
did not survive the injured party's death.' Similar to most other
jurisdictions, Texas has abrogated this rule by enactment of what is
'Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 5525 (1958).
"Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. arts. 4671-78 (1952).
'Prosser, Torts § 105 (2d ed. 1955).
19641
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commonly called a "survival statute."4 It was also a rule of common
law that the death of a human being did not give rise to a civil action.!
However, Lord Campbell's Act,6 passed in 1846, changed the rule in
England and created a cause of action for the death which was to
be brought by the deceased's executor or administrator for the benefit
of the surviving wife, husband, parent, and child. Again, following
most American jurisdictions, Texas has adopted a wrongful death
statute7 patterned after the English act.
The damages recoverable under the Texas survival statute are gen-
erally described as those which the deceased could have recovered had
he lived, i.e., those which the deceased suffered up to the time of his
death s Recovery has been granted for physical pain and mental
anguish,' reasonable medical expenses, reasonable funeral expenses,"
and property damages." On the other hand, the damages recoverable
under the provisions of the Texas death act' are limited to the
pecuniary losses of the statutory beneficiaries as a result of the dece-
dent's death.'" Here, recovery includes the present monetary value of
the benefits which the statutory beneficiaries had a reasonable expec-
tation of receiving from the deceased 4 and reasonable medical and
funeral expenses if paid by the statutory beneficiaries."
' Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 5525 (1958), which provides in part: [A] 11 such causes
of action shall survive to and in favor of the heirs and legal representatives and estate of
such injured party .. "
' The most famous statement of this rule was expressed by Lord Ellenborough: "In a civil
court the death of a human being cannot be complained of as an injury." Baker v. Bolton,
I Camp. 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (K.B. 1808).
89 & 10 Vict. c. 93.
"Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. arts. 4671-78 (1952). Art. 4671 provides in part:
An action for actual damages on account of the injuries causing the death of
any person may be brought in the following cases: 1. When an injury causing
the death of any person is caused by the wrongful act, neglect, carelessness,
unskilfulness, or default of another perons....
Art. 4675 provides:
Actions . . .shall be for the sole and exclusive benefit of and may be brought
by the surviving husband, wife, children, and parents of the person whose
death has been caused or by either of them for the benefit of all.
S'Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. Groseclose, 50 Tex. Civ. App. 525, 134 S.W. 736 (1911) error
ref.
' Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. v. Moore, 28 Tex. Civ. App. 603, 68 S.W. 559 (1902).
'
5 Jenney v. Jackson, 46 S.W.2d 418 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932).
" G.H. & S.A.R.R. v. Freeman, 57 Tex. 156 (1882); Ferrill's Adm'x v. Mooney's Ex'rs,
33 Tex. 220 (1870); Jenney v. Jackson, supra note 10; Texas & N.O.R.R. v. Smith, 35
Tex. Civ. App. 351, 80 S.W. 247 (1904).
"Tex. Rev. Civ. Star. Ann. art. 4677 (1952) provides that the "jury may give such
damages as they think proportionate to the injury resulting from such death." But see
notes 13-15 infra.
"aMarch v. Walker, 48 Tex. 372 (1877); San Antonio & A.P. Ry. v. Brock, 35 Tex.
Civ. App. 155, 80 S.W. 422 (1904) error ref.; Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. Hines, 18 Tex. Civ.
App. 580, 40 S.W. 152 (1897).
'"McGown v. International & G.N.R.R., 85 Tex. 289, 20 S.W. 80 (1892).
"Smith v. Farrington, 117 Tex. 459, 6 S.W.2d 736 (1928); Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. v.
Southwick, 30 S.W. 592 (Tex. Civ. App. 1895). There is an apparent overlap in allowing re-
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If separate suits are brought under each statute-the survival
statute and the death act-whether these statutes create one or two
causes of action becomes a key issue. The courts have held consistently
that the doctrine of res judicata will not permit a cause of action" to
be split to create the basis for successive suits between the same
parties.17 However, the rule does not prevent litigation of different
causes of action in separate suits, even though the actions properly
could have been united in a single suit."' The definitions of "cause
of action" have been numerous and discordant."' Because modern pro-
cedural codes have broadened the concept of what constitutes a cause
of action, the res judicata rule against splitting a cause of action has
a broader application than at common law." Various tests have been
suggested to determine if a single cause of action exists: (1) the
evidence in the two suits is identical; (2) a single right is violated;
(3) a single act or contract is involved, without reference to its
effect; (4) the same findings and judgment are involved. 1 In com-
menting on the various tests, Judge Clark said:
These may be suggestive but are obviously not to be taken as conclusive
tests in themselves. In fact the search for an automatic rule of thumb
is illusory as in law generally, particularly procedural law. . . .The
rule would seem more general and more vague than as indicated by such
tests .... Where there is no prevailing standard otherwise, the control-
ling consideration in determining the extent of the cause should be trial
convenience, with much discretion accorded the trial court."
To avoid the uncertainty of such tests, it has been said: "The only
positive method of ascertaining what items are included in a single
cause of action is to research the substantive law involved in any
particular case.""
covery of medical and funeral expenses under both statutes, but this does not violate the
theories of recovery. If the statutory beneficiaries in a wrongful death action have paid or
become legally obligated to pay the medical and funeral expenses, these items are properly
included in .the meaning of "pecuniary loss."
l" Harris v. City of Houston, 21 Tex. Civ. App. 432, 60 S.W. 440 (1900) error ref.;
Restatement, Judgments § 62 (1942); Clark, Joinder and Splitting of Causes of Action, 25
Mich. L. Rev. 393, 417 (1927).
"Maryland Cas. Co. v. Hendrick Memorial Hosp., 141 Tex. 23, 169 S.W.2d 969 (1943);
Restatement, Judgments § 62, comment b (1942).
"Moore v. Snowball, 98 Tex. 16, 81 S.W. 5 (1904); Mullinax v. Fidelity Union Fire
Ins. Co., 114 S.W.2d 323 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938), rev'd on other grounds, 132 Tex. 485,
123 S.W.2d 288 (1939); International & G.N. Ry. v. Concrete Inv. Co., 201 S.W. 718
(Tex. Civ. App. 1917); Clark, supra note 16, at 417.
19Note, 13 Sw. L.J. 281 (1959).
"Clark, supra note 16, at 417.
" Id. at 420. For a discussion by the Texas Supreme Court of what constitutes a single
cause of action, see both the majority and the dissenting opinions in Moore v. Snowball, 98
Tex. 16, 81 S.W. 5 (1904); for application of the "same evidence test," see note 40 infra.
"Clark, supra note 16, at 420.
"Shipman, Splitting a Cause of Action in Texas: A Survey and Analysis, 36 Texas L.
Rev. 475 (1958).
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As early as 1876, an English case held that a judgment recovered
under the wrongful death act by a personal representative did not
preclude a subsequent suit by the representative to recover for dam-
age to the decedent's personal property. The court recognized sepa-
rate causes of action resulting from the same wrongful act." Decisions
in the United States are in conflict, but of the jurisdictions which
have met the problem squarely, the majority have held that there
are two causes of action which can be brought in separate suits."5
Previous to the principal case, the question had not arisen in Texas.2
In the principal case, the Texas Supreme Court stated that two
separate and distinct causes of action may arise if wrongfully in-
flicted injuries result in death."' However, the court pointed out that
neither claim asserted in the principal case-under the survival
statute-could have been included in the prior suit-under the
wrongful death act-because (1) the plaintiffs in that suit had
neither paid nor become legally responsible for the funeral expenses
and (2) the heirs were not entitled to assert a claim for property
24 Leggott v. Great N. Ry., I Q.B.D. 599 (1876). It should be noted that in this case
it was decided that the same person could bring both suits separately. This question was
expressly unanswered in the principal case.
2 Hamel v. Southern Ry., 108 Miss. 172, 66 So. 809 (1915); Hindmarsh v. Sulpho
Saline Bath Co., 108 Neb. 168, 187 N.W. 806 (1922); Mahoning Valley Ry. v. Van Alstine,
77 Ohio St. 395, 83 N.E. 601 (1908); St. Louis & S.F.R.R. v. Goode, 42 Okla. 784, 142
Pac. 1185 (1914); contra, Lubrano v. Atlantic Mills, 19 R.I. 129, 32 Atl. 205 (1895).
The existence of two causes of action is sufficient to preclude the application of the res
judicata principles of merger and bar, but the principle of collateral estoppel may have a
significant effect on the second suit if the real parties in interest are the same in both suits.
Further discussion of collateral estoppel is beyond the scope of this Note. See generally
Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Webb, 177 S.W.2d 218 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943) error ref.
w.o.m.; Old River Rice Irr. Co. v. Stubbs, 168 S.W. 28 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914) error ref.;
Annot., 88 A.L.R. 574 (1934); Restatement, Judgments § 92 (1942).
'However, in Marcus v. Huguley, it was held that the plaintiffs' recovery in a
suit for their personal injuries did not preclude their bringing a subsequent action under the
death statute for the loss due to their daughter's death which resulted from the same acci-
dent. The court said:
The former suit was the prosecution of a separate and distinct cause of action
from the one now prosecuted; though both suits are based on the commis-
sion of the same wrongful act. The former suit accrued as purely a common-
law cause of action and arose immediately when the injuries were inflicted on
the parties; the instant suit is purely a statutory suit and did not accrue until
the death of the daughter . . . therefore, the bringing of the two separate suits
is not a splitting of a single cause of action. 37 S.W.2d 1100, 1104 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1931) error dism.
The court further stated that the theory against splitting a cause of action "is a well-
recognized rule . . . [but) has no reference to different causes of action accruing to the same
parties in different rights, though the causes of action may have resulted from the same
wrongful act." Ibid. Although the Marcus case did not present the question whether the
survival statute and the wrongful death statute create separate causes of action, the court's
reasoning seems adaptable to the problem of the principal case.
2 One is the common-law action for damages sustained by the decedent and his estate
which survives to the heirs or legal representative under the provisions of the survival statute.
The other cause of action is conferred by the wrongful death statute upon the deceased's
surviving spouse, children, and parents to recover their damages as a result of the death.
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damage to the automobile since there was a necessity for administra-
tion (which is assumed unless the contrary is shown).", In refusing
to go as far as other jurisdictions that have allowed successive suits on
the broad theory that two distinct causes of action are created by the
two statutes,2 ' the court stated that the problem would be somewhat
different if the prior action had been prosecuted by the administrator
on behalf of the statutory beneficiaries"° or if there had been no
necessity of administration.31 The question whether the same per-
son could bring separate suits on the two causes of action was ex-
pressly left unanswered by the court."2 In conjunction with this
reservation, the court cited a Kentucky case 3 which held that an
administrator could not bring a second suit for property damage after
having recovered for the death. However, it is important to note that
the Kentucky statutes have been construed to confer the death action
directly upon the administrator; he is then required to elect"' whether
he will seek remedy under the survival statute" or under the death
statute." In light of this election, Kentucky cases should be weighed
accordingly by jurisdictions that subscribe to the separate-causes-of-
action theory.
By limiting the scope of the decision in the principal case, the
court makes it difficult to determine what its holding will be if claims
arising under the two statutes are capable of being joined, but are
asserted by the same person in different suits. In such a situation, the
court may hold that the claims create a single cause of action if all
the claims are owned by the same person. In order to harmonize such
a holding with the decision of the principal case, the court could dis-
tinguish the latter by reasoning that there are necessarily two causes
of action in a case in which the claims are owned by different indi-
viduals.' The following factors suggest such a holding:
28 369 S.W.2d at 35. The court cited as authority for the last statement: Lee v. Turner,
71 Tex. 264, 9 S.W. 149 (1888); 19 Tex. Jur. 2d Decedents' Estates 5 958.
"9 See note 25 supra.
a0 Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4675 (1952) provides that the administrator may prose-
cute the action on behalf of the named beneficiaries if none of the beneficiaries do so within
three months after the death.
a 369 S.W.2d at 36.
32 Ibid.
'Coles' Adm'x v. Illinois Ccnt. R.R., 120 Ky. 686, 87 S.W. 1082 (1905).4 Chesapeake & Ohio R.R. v. Banks' Adm'r, 142 Ky. 746, 135 S.W. 285 (1911);
Conner's Adm'x v. Paul, 75 Ky. 144 (1876).
S'Ky. Rev. Star. § 411.140 (1960).
"OKy. Rev. Stat. § 411.130 (1960).
'"In Southern Ry. v. King, 160 Fed. 332 (5th Cir. 1908), the court stated: "The rule
as to a single cause of action has no application where the injury is suffered in a different
capacity, or by different persons. In such cases there is [sic], of necessity, two causes of
action .. " Id. at 335; Restatement, Judgments § 80, comment b (1942).
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1. The language of the opinion is cautious. The court said:
A. Two separate and distinct causes of action may arise if in-
juries wrongfully inflicted result in death.
B. Judgment in a wrongful death action does not necessarily
bar a subsequent suit on behalf of the estate."
2. The Kentucky case, discussed above, was cited by the court in
connection with its express reservation.
3. Substantially the same evidence is required to support both ac-
tions.
4. Recent Texas civil appeals case' have held that if an individual
sustains both personal and property damage in the same occurrence,
there exists only one cause of action. An analogy may be drawn by
the court between those cases and the problem suggested here. In
both situations, there is only one negligent act which causes property
damage and personal injury to the same person.
On the other hand, there are good arguments in support of a
holding that there are two causes of action, even though the same
individual may sue:
1. The actions are conferred by two different statutes.
2. If the administrator brings both causes of action, it may be
urged that his capacities are different in each." When suing under
the survival statute, he acts on behalf of the estate; yet in the case
of the wrongful death statute, the administrator maintains the action
for the benefit of the beneficiaries named in the statute.' However,
this difference in capacity on the part of the plaintiff would not be
3' 369 S.W.2d at 35.
3' Coles' Adm'x v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 120 Ky. 686, 875 S.W. 1082 (1905). See text
accompanying notes 32-36 supra.
4' For Texas cases which have applied the "same evidence test", see Medley v. Brown,
202 S.W. 137 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918) error ref.; Whitney v. Parish of Vernon, 154 S.W.
264 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913) error ref.
4 Garrett v. Mathews, 343 S.W.2d 289 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961); Cormier v. Highway
Trucking Co., 312 S.W.2d 406 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958); contra, Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Nelson,
9 Tex. Civ. App. 156, 29 S.W. 78 (1894) error ref.; Watson v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 8 Tex.
Civ. App. 144, 27 S.W. 924 (1894).
'Davis v. First Nat'l Bank, 139 Tex. 36, 161 S.W.2d 467 (1942); Pryor v. Krause,
168 S.W. 498 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914) error ref.; Restatement, Judgments § 80 (1942).
'Houston & T.C. Ry. v. Hook, 60 Tex. 403 (1883), concerning the capacity of the
administrator suing under the death statute:
It is a special power conferred upon the person who may be executor or ad-
ministrator, not because the matter pertains to the estate, but because the legis-
lature deemed the persons who might be executors or administrators, more
likely than others, to be proper persons to maintain suits to preserve and en-
force the right of the beneficiaries named in the act. The power might have
been given to any officer of the county, without reference to whether they had
any connection with the estate of the decedent or not, or might have been
given to any other person. Id. at 407.
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significant if the "real parties in interest" are the same in both suits,"
e.g., if the only statutory beneficiaries were the sole heirs.
3. As a corollary to the separate capacity distinction discussed
above, it should be noted that the recoveries under the two actions
flow into different channels. Damages recovered in the wrongful
death action go directly to the statutory beneficiaries and are not
subject to the debts of the deceased. ' Action under the survival
statute is on behalf of the estate, and thus creditors are permitted to
share in the recovery.
It is submitted that the stronger legal arguments favor the view
that there are two separate and distinct causes of action conferred by
the statutes. Therefore, the Texas courts should hold that the same
person is not precluded by any rule of res judicata from prosecuting
a separate suit on each cause of action. However, because of the
flexibility of many of these concepts, the emphatic limitation on the
scope of the decision in the principal case, and the vaguely annunci-
ated policy against "multiplicity of law suits," it is strongly urged
that the practitioner should avoid successive suits if claims under
the death and the survival acts can possibly be joined.
James W. Brennan
Torts - Liability Insurance - Stowers
Doctrine and Duty to Settle
While in Mexico with two friends, the owner of an automobile
purchased a 5,000 dollar public liability insurance policy from the
defendant, a Mexican insurance corporation. Thereafter, the auto-
mobile collided with a bus on a Mexican highway and the plaintiff,
one of the insured's passengers, sustained serious bodily injuries which
resulted in his being a permanent quadriplegic. When notified by
the insured of the accident, the defendant-insurer settled with the
bus company for damages to the bus. After returning to the United
States, the plaintiff wrote the defendant-insurer concerning his claim,
but received no reply. The plaintiff then offered to settle with the
insured for 5,000 dollars, but the offer was rejected for lack of funds;
the defendant-insurer had no knowledge of this offer. After suit was
filed against the insured, the insured contacted the defendant-insurer
and requested that it defend the suit. The defendant-insurer refused
"Cavers v. Sioux Oil & Ref. Co., 39 S.W.2d 862 (Tex. Comm. App. 1931); Hartford
Fire Ins. Co. v. King, 31 Tex. Civ. App. 636, 73 S.W. 71 (1903).
4" Houston & T.C. Ry. v. Hook, 60 Tex. 403 (1883).
1964]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
to defend and disclaimed all liability under the policy to the plaintiff.
Subsequently, the plaintiff obtained a judgment against the insured
for 270,000 dollars. In the principal case plaintiff seeks to recover
270,000 dollars from the defendant insurance company in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. The plain-
tiff alleges that defendant-insurer was negligent in failing to initiate
and negotiate a settlement and that such negligence was the proxi-
mate cause of the judgment rendered against the insured. Plaintiff
further alleges that he is entitled to recovery as a third party bene-
ficiary to the contract of insurance between defendant and the in-
sured. Held: Under the Stowers doctrine of Texas,1 an automobile
liability insurer: (1) owes a duty to exercise ordinary care in initi-
ating and negotiating for a settlement within policy limits and (2)
may be sued directly by an injured third party for breach of that
duty for the full amount of the judgment rendered against the
insured, including that portion in excess of policy limits.! Bostrom v.
Seguros Tepeyac, S.A., 225 F. Supp. 222 (N.D. Tex. 1963).
The Stowers doctrine, as it is popularly known in Texas,' had its
origin in 1929 in G.A. Stowers Furniture Co. v. American Indem.
Co.4 In that case the insurance company issued a 5,000 dollar auto-
mobile insurance policy. The provisions of the policy reserved to the
insurer control and settlement rights in any suit or claim arising
under the policy. The insurer assumed the defense of a suit against
the insured. Before trial the injured party offered to accept 4,000
dollars in full settlement of the claim, but this offer was rejected by
the insurer. The injured party subsequently obtained a judgment
against the insured for an amount in excess of the policy limits.
After paying the judgment,' the insured brought suit against the
insurer to recover the amount paid. The court held that: (1) the
insurer, under the terms of the policy, acted as the exclusive agent
of the insured in all matters pertaining to the suit; (2) as agent, a
1 G.A. Stowers Furniture Co. v. American Indem. Co., 15 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. Comm. App.
1929). See note 4 infra and accompanying text.The scope of this Note is limited to a discussion of duties involved in the Stowers doc-
trine, i.e., the nature of the duties and to whom they are owed.
aChancey v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 336 S.W.2d 763, 764 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960)
error ref. n.r.e.
4 15 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. Comm. App. 1929).
In the principal case nothing had been paid by the insured on the $270,000.00 judgment
rendered against him in the prior suit. If the policy involved in the principal case was an
indemnity policy, as in Stowers, the insured would have a cause of action against the insurer
only for the amount actually paid to the plaintiff. However, under a liability insurance policy,
although there is no Texas case in point, the insured probably could bring his cause of action
against the insurance company without having paid any portion of the judgment. See Uni-
versal Auto. Ins. Co. v. Culberson, 126 Tex. 282, 86 S.W.2d 727 (1935); American Indem.
Co. v. Fellbaum, 114 Tex. 127, 263 S.W. 908 (1924).
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duty was imposed to exercise ordinary care to protect the interest of
the insured to the amount of the policy limits; and (3) if that duty
was breached, the insured had a cause of acton against the insurer for
the total amount of the judgment, including the amount in excess
of policy limits. However, the Stowers doctrine specifically deals
with only that portion of the judgment in excess of policy limits.'
The Stowers case held that the negligence of the insurer was the
proximate cause of the excess amount of the judgment against the
insured.7
The situation in the principal case can be distinguished from that
of the Stowers case in at least two respects. First, the negligence of
the insurer consists of failure to initiate and negotiate for a settlement,
rather than a rejection of an offer of settlement within policy limits
as in the Stowers case. Second, the party claiming damages as a result
of the insurer's negligence is the injured third party, rather than
the insured."
The first distinction involves the scope of the duty placed upon
the insurer in matters of settlement. The established standard of care
in Texas requires the degree of care and diligence which an ordinarily
prudent person would exercise in the conduct of his own business."
In settling a claim, the insurer is required to protect its own interests,
as well as those of the insured. Concerning this function of the
insurer, the court commented in the Stowers case: "Where one acts
as agent under such circumstances, he is bound to give the rights of
his principal at least as great consideration as he does his own."1 In
the Stowers case a duty was placed upon the insurer to exercise ordi-
nary care in the consideration of a settlement offer. Such a duty was
not in issue in the principal case. Although an offer of settlement
within policy limits was made to the insured, the offer was not
communicated to the defendant. The court found that the failure
to communicate the offer did not bar plaintiff's recovery because
plaintiff's allegation charged defendant with failure to initiate and
negotiate a settlement, rather than rejection of the settlement offer. 1
The court found that the duty to use ordinary care to initiate and
6 In Stowers the insurance company alleged that it was ready and willing to pay $5,000.00,
which was the amount of the policy limit.
7 G.A. Stowers Furniture Co. v. American Indem. Co., 15 S.W.2d 544, 545 (Tex. Comm.
App. 1929).
8 Ibid.
' G.A. Stowers Furniture Co. v. American Indem. Co., 15 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. Comm.
App. 1929); Jones v. Highway Ins. Underwriters, 253 S.W.2d 1018 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952)
error ref. n.r.e.; Highway Ins. Underwriters v. Lufkin-Beaumont Motor Coaches, Inc., 215
S.W.2d 904 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) error ref. n.r.e.
0 G.A. Stowers Furniture Co. v. American Indem. Co., supra note 9, at 548.
"225 F. Supp. at 234.
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negotiate a settlement within policy limits exists irrespective of any
duty to defend the law suit."2 To support this holding, the court
quoted a recent Texas case which stated: "It is our view that the
duty to settle implies the duty to negotiate. These two duties cannot
be separated as far as the basic obligation to the insured is concerned.
It is difficult to see how any controversy could be settled without
some measure of negotiation."' 3 Having found that the defendant
had the absolute right to settle claims covered by the policy, the court
held that a duty was imposed upon the defendant to exercise due care
in the exercise of that right. 4
After finding a duty imposed upon the defendant and a breach
of that duty,1 5 the court was then confronted with defendant's con-
tention that plaintiff could not maintain an action upon a policy to
which he was not an actual party." No Texas case directly supports
the court's holding on this point, i.e., allowing an injured party to
proceed directly against the insurer on a judgment held against the
insured for an amount in excess of policy limits. The Stowers case
and other cases applying the doctrine have involved situations in
which the plaintiff was the insured and the defendant was the insurer."
A suit in a Stowers fact situation actually involves both a cause of
action in contract under the terms of the policy and a cause of action
in tort for the amount of the judgment in excess of policy limits."
Thus, the principal case can be viewed as a suit in contract under the
terms of the policy for 5,000 dollars and as a suit in tort for de-
fendant's negligence for 265,000 dollars. The holding in the prin-
cipal case, that plaintff may proceed directly against the defendant
for the policy amount as a third party beneficiary to the insurance
2 Ibid.13 Chancey v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 336 S.W.2d 763, 765 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960)
error ref. n.r.e. Accord, Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Robb, 267 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1959).
14 225 F. Supp. at 233. The court relied upon a Mexican statute that was admitted into
evidence as a part of the insurance contract. The Statute, article 148 of "LAW GOVERN-
ING INSURANCE CONTRACTS, of 1935, as amended" stated:
No acknowledgment of indebtedness, compromise or any other act of legal
significance of a similar nature, made or agreed upon without the consent of
the insurance company, may be used against the latter. The admission of the
existence of a fact cannot be deemed to be the acknowledgment of liability.
15 See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
16225 F. Supp. at 225.
" The Texas cases following Stowers have presented similar situations. The court in
Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Robb, 267 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1959), stated: "[The Slowers case]
has not been in anywise modified or departed from in the thirty years since, in 1929, it
came down." Id. at 477.
18 In Highway Ins. Underwriters v. Lufkin-Beaumont Motor Coaches, Inc., 215 S.W.2d
904 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) error ref. n.r.e., the court stated: "The petition asserts, in effect,
two causes of action, one for the sums contracted to be paid and one (in tort) for the excess
of the judgment above those sums .... " Id. at 906.
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contract,' is supported by the Mexican federal statute that was held
to be a part of the insurance contract and by the Texas cases."' How-
ever, plaintiff's right to a third party beneficiary to sue on the tort
arising out of the contract requires closer analysis. The court relied
upon the Texas case of House v. Houston Waterworks Co." In the
House case the plaintiff, a resident of Houston, asserted that he was
a third party beneficiary to a tort arising out of a contract (not
a contract of insurance) between the waterworks company and the
city of Houston. The court denied recovery because the contract was
not made for the benefit of plaintiff. In dictum the court did recog-
nize that a third party beneficiary to a contract could be injured by
a tort arising out of the contract. However, the court recognized that
for such beneficiary to sue in tort, the relationships of the parties to
the contract must be such that a duty is owed to the beneficiary."
New Hampshire originally provided Texas with the theory and
foundation for the Stowers doctrine.' Significantly, the New Hamp-
shire Supreme Court also has answered the question of a third party's
standing to sue. An injured third party held a judgment against the
insured and asserted a right to sue the insurer for the amount of the
judgment in excess of policy limits; the New Hampshire court stated:
[T]he duty of an insurance company to protect its insured against
liability cannot consistently be extended to include protection to one
who is seeking to hold the insured liable.
In short, conduct to be legally wrongful must contravene some duty
which the law attaches to the relation between the parties and it is
clear that no relationship here exists between [the injured third party]
and the [insurer] which would permit the maintenance of the present
action."
1"225 F. Supp. at 232.
"oThe court stated: "When Art. 147 of the Mexican federal statutes is read into the
[insured's] policy, the [plaintiff] is in privity to the insurance contract so as to entitle
him to sue the defendant insurance company." Ibid.
21 Womack v. Allstate Ins. Co., 156 Tex. 467, 296 S.W.2d 233 (1956); Commercial
Standard Ins. Co. v. Ebner, 149 Tex. 28, 228 S.W.2d 507 (1950); Seaton v. Pickens, 126
Tex. 271, 87 S.W.2d 709 (1935).
"88 Tex. 233, 31 S.W. 179 (1895).
2Id. at 180-81.
"G.A. Stowers Furniture Co. v. American Indem. Co., 15 S.W.2d 544, 547 (Tex.
Comm. App. 1929). This is also illustrated by the principal case in which the court stated,
"Douglas v. United States F. & G. Co., 1924, 81 N.H. 371, 127 A. 708, 37 A.L.R. 1477,
which was the foundation for the decision in the Stowers case. ... 225 F. Supp. at 234.
"SDuncan v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 91 N.H. 349, 23 A.2d 325, 326 (1941).
In discussing this situation, Keeton, in Liability Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement,
67 Harv. L. Rev. 1136 (1954), stated:
The excess liability of company arises out of the relationship between insured
and company. Claimant is a stranger to that relationship. Not only is company
without any duty to claimant to accept claimant's reasonable settlement offer,
but also, if there is a sizable disparity between the settlement offer and the
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This decision is based upon sound reasoning and is clear authority
for holding that the duty imposed upon the insurer in settlement
matters runs only to the insured. Since the suit in the principal case
is primarily in tort"6 for the amount of the judgment in excess of
policy limits, the plaintiff (third party) must meet the requirements
of duty and damage. Not only is there no duty owed to the third
party, but also the third party actually sustained no damage by the
insurance company's breach of the duty it owed to the insured. Only
the insured suffered any damage."' It is submitted that the Texas
courts would not allow such a suit under the Stowers doctrine."
Arthur E. Hewett
amount of the judgment obtained in the trial which follows refusal of the
offer, claimant is benefited rather than harmed by company's refusal to settle.
Id. at 1176.
"* See note 18 supra and accompanying text. If the current standard Texas liability in-
surance policy was governing in the principal case, the plaintiff could proceed directly against
the defendant in a contract action for the $5,000.00 policy limit. The following condition
of a standard policy would seem to allow such an action:
No action shall lie against the company unless, as a condition precedent
thereto, the insured shall have fully complied with all the terms of this policy,
nor until the amount of the insured's obligation to pay shall have been finally
determined either by judgment against the insured after actual trial or by
written agreement of the insured, the claimant and the company.
Any person or organization or the legal representative thereof who has secured
such judgment or written agreement shall thereafter be entitled to recover
under this policy to the extent of the insurance afforded by this policy.
Nothing contained in this policy shall give any person or organization any right
to join the company as a co-defendant in any action against the insured to
determine the insured's liability.
Bankruptcy or insolvency of the insured or of the insured's estate shall not
relieve the company of any of its obligation hereunder. (Emphasis added.)
27 The third party is in fact benefited by the insurance company's breach of its duty
to the insured. See note 25 supra.
"s If we assume that the insured can collect from the insurance company in a Stowers
situation without having paid any portion of the judgment, see note 5 supra, there is a public
policy argument that can be advanced in favor of the injured party, viz., the policy in favor
of the efficient judicial administration and the policy against circuity of actions warrant the
injured party to join in one law suit against the insurance company: (1) the contract claim
for the amount of the policy and (2) the tort claim for the excess, if the insured has not
brought suit against the insurance company and presumably acquiesces in such proceeding.
However, this public policy argument is outweighed by the obvious value of maintaining
the traditional requirements of a duty and a breach of that duty to allow recovery in
negligence.
